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STEPHEN E. DEMOS∗ 
 
The Fair Pay Fair Play Act of 2015: Does Congress 
Spot-ify a Solution for the Music Market? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In today’s music marketplace, a growing number of consumers are turning toward 
digital streaming services for their musical listening needs.1 According to the latest 
Nielsen music consumer report, in 2015, on-demand audio streams increased by 
83.1%, while total album and digital track sales decreased by 6.1% and 12.5% 
respectively.2  One reason for this trend is the overall improvement in Internet speeds, 
cellular networks, and smart phones.3 With faster devices and wireless/cellular 
networks, consumers no longer have to carry hardware solely devoted to music 
storage and playback, such as CD players and iPods.4 Instead, they can simply play or 
stream a song directly on their device over their Internet or cellular network.5  
Generally, digital streaming music services can be separated into two sub-
categories: interactive on-demand services and noninteractive services.6  Interactive 
on-demand services such as Spotify and Apple Music allow the user to choose specific 
songs, albums, and playlists to listen to within a vast catalog of offerings.7  
Noninteractive services such as Pandora play music based on user preferences, but 
do not allow the user to select particular songs or albums at will.8 In both instances, 
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 1.  THE NIELSEN COMPANY, 2015 NIELSEN MUSIC U.S. REPORT 7–8 (2016), http://www.nielsen.com/ 
us/en/insights/reports/2016/2015-music-us-year-end-report.html. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, MUSIC CONSUMER INSIGHT REPORT 
2016 8–9 (2016), http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Music-Consumer-Insight-Report-2016.pdf. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See id. 
 6.  Madi Alexander & Ben Sisario, Apple Music, Spotify and a Guide to Music Streaming Services, N.Y. TIMES 
(April 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/30/business/media/music-streaming-guide. 
html?_r=0. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
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the consumer usually has a choice between purchasing a subscription for premium 
content and ad-free listening or to use a free version that has less features and more 
advertisements.9   
Despite the obvious benefits of convenience and accessibility provided by online 
streaming, not all market participants have benefitted from these shifts in music 
consumption and distribution patterns.10 One reason for this is that the existing 
copyright regulatory scheme does not fully take into account how music is packaged 
and consumed in the Internet and music streaming age. As a result, market 
participants, from top to bottom, are experiencing various disincentives and 
incurring unnecessary transaction costs.11  
Specifically, under the existing system, musicians and songwriters do not feel that 
they are receiving fair consideration for their music.12 For example, “if you were one 
of the 6.5 million people who listened to Bon Jovi’s ‘Livin’ on a Prayer’ on Pandora 
during a three-month span in 2012, you helped him, and his two co-writers, split a 
grand total of $110.”13  
Furthermore, as the musical work or recording passes through the production and 
sales process, market participants do not have the accurate song ownership and 
royalty distribution data necessary to facilitate the smooth exchange of intellectual 
property rights and payment.14 This, in turn, prevents artists from receiving 
compensation for their works and also results in otherwise avoidable infringement 
suits for music providers.15   
To make matters worse, even when music providers can properly identify the 
correct rights holders, the outdated licensing and rate-setting procedures set rates 
unevenly across fundamentally similar music distribution services and are 
particularly burdensome for all involved.16 Since 2009, the American Society of 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”) has reported that it and several 
other applicants have collectively spent more than one hundred million dollars on 
litigation expenses related to rate court proceedings.17 
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  The various market participants that will be discussed in Part II of this Comment are songwriters, music 
publishers, performing rights organizations, mechanical rights administrators, recording artists, producers, 
record companies, music providers, and consumers. 
 11.  See infra Part III. 
 12.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 68 (2015) [hereinafter MUSIC 
MARKETPLACE].  
 13.  Doug Gross, Songwriters: Spotify Doesn’t Pay Off . . . Unless You’re a Taylor Swift, CNN (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/12/tech/web/spotify pay musicians.  
 14.  See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 68. 
 15.  See id. at 107. 
 16.  See id. at 1. 
 17.  Id. at 93. 
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In an effort to address these issues, on April 13, 2015, Congressman Jerrold Nadler 
introduced the bi-partisan-sponsored House Resolution 1733, the Fair Play Fair Pay 
Act of 2015 (“FPFPA”), to the House Floor.18 The legislation is currently pending in 
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 
however, momentum on the FPFPA has appeared to have stalled.  
This Comment aims to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
regulatory scheme and its impact on market participants.  It draws on this analysis 
and the relevant literature to develop policy recommendations that more directly 
address the issues affecting the music market. These recommendations propose: (1) 
eliminating the differential statutory pricing treatment for sound recordings and 
musical works; (2) removing the terrestrial radio exemption to royalty obligations; 
(3) incorporating pre-1972 recordings into the federal regulatory scheme; (4) 
establishing a consistent fair market value standard for licenses across the entire 
market; and (5) creating incentives that foster the public availability of accurate song 
ownership data and accounting.   
This Comment begins by examining the history of music copyright law in this 
nation and how it has evolved in response to past technological advances that have 
similarly impacted the music marketplace.19  It then explains the role each industry 
participant plays in the market and how they interact with one another.20 Next, the 
Comment highlights the underlying inefficiencies plaguing the music market today.21 
It then explains how the general policy recommendations enumerated above would 
appropriately address these issues.22 It concludes by showing how these general policy 
recommendations manifest themselves within the context of the FPFPA and 
maintains that, if passed, the FPFPA would meaningfully address many of the issues 
surrounding the market and regulatory scheme.23 
II.  THE MUSIC MARKET, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE REGULATORY 
SCHEME 
Since its inception, the Copyright Act has governed musical licensing.24 Its history, 
which is outlined in Subsection A, is marked by fluid revisions and amendments that 
attempt to address the effects of emerging technologies in the market while 
simultaneously balancing both anti-trust and free-market considerations.25 In these 
 
 18.  Fair Play Fair Pay Act of 2015, H.R. 1733, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 19.  See infra Part II.B. 
 20.  See infra Part II.A. 
 21.  See infra Part III. 
 22.  See infra Part IV. 
 23.  See infra Part V. 
 24.  See United States Copyright Law, HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT, http://www.historyofcopyright.org/pb/ 
wp_fe548a29/wp_fe548a29.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2016); Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).  
 25.  See United States Copyright Law, supra note 24. 
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attempts, Congress has had to consider the interests of numerous industry 
participants including: songwriters, music publishers, performing rights 
organizations, mechanical rights administrators, recording artists, producers, record 
companies, music providers, and consumers.  
Subsection B plots the lifecycle of a musical work and sound recording as they pass 
through the various stages of production and also tracks the distinct copyrights 
associated with the work. Due to the fact that not all songwriters and recording artists 
are born wealthy or make good sales people, manufacturers, accountants, and 
lawyers, the music industry utilizes economies of scale and specialization to facilitate 
output. Consequently, unless the artist handles every stage of production and 
distribution independently, by the time a song ultimately reaches the consumer, 
numerous industry participants have handled the product in some form or another. 
A.  Technological Advances and the Evolution of Copyright Law 
Congress passed the first federal Copyright Act in 1790 “for the encouragement of 
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and 
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”26 The law granted 
“the author and authors . . . the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, 
publishing and vending such map, chart, book or books, for the like term of fourteen 
years” and a renewal term of fourteen years, for a total of twenty eight years.27 It also 
required compliance with certain procedural formalities which included notice, 
deposits, publication in the U.S., and recordation in the federal district court where 
the author resided.28  If any of these formalities were not followed, the work was not 
protected and consequently free to be copied.29 Even though this Act did not expressly 
recognize musical works, such works were simply treated as “books” and were 
afforded the necessary copyright protections.30 At the time of the Act’s passage, music 
could only be consumed by reading the actual sheet music and lyrics or by listening 
to it being performed live.31  
Forty one years later, in an effort to mimic the protections offered by European 
countries,32 Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1831 and established a new 
 
 26.  Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 125. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829); I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and New Use 
Technologies, 23 NOVA. L. REV. 659, 664 (1999). 
 31.  See Dann Albright, The Evolution of Music Consumption: How We Got Here, MAKEUSEOF, at 5 (April 
2015), http://cdn.makeuseof.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/The-Evolution-of-Music-Consumption-How-
We-Got-Here.pdf; Callie Taintor, Chronology: Technology and the Music Industry, PBS (May 27, 2004), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/music/inside/cron.html. 
 32.  See United States Copyright Law, supra note 24 (quoting the House Judiciary’s report from December 
17, 1829). 
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category of protection exclusively for musical works.33 While this amendment did not 
establish public performance rights, it did establish the owner’s right to reproduce 
and distribute their compositions.34  
Unsurprisingly, the conspicuous absence of a protected public performance right 
created an avenue for exploitation in the music and drama industries.35 Without an 
established public performance right, pirate musicians and play companies were able 
to profit off others’ musical works without ever having to pay the writer more than 
the cost of purchasing the sheet music or script.36  After some time and debate, 
Congress finally addressed this performance right deficiency in 1897 and expanded 
the scope of copyright protections to include the right to perform the work publicly.37  
While this debate was ongoing, in 1877, Thomas Edison invented the 
phonograph.38 On that day and for the first time in history, sound was transcribed 
onto an audible medium.39 By 1885, rival inventors Chichester Bell and Charles 
Tainter invented the graphophone.40 The graphophone, like Edison’s phonograph, 
recorded sound on an engraved wax cylinder which would rotate against a stylus.41 
Two years later, Edison responded with improvements to his original phonograph 
incorporating a battery powered motor which produced a constant pitch.42 Then, in 
1888, Emile Berliner invented the gramophone, which used a disc rather than a 
cylinder as the recording medium.43 “The discs [were] flat, measure[d] seven inches 
in diameter, and [could] hold up to two minutes of recorded sound.”44 By the turn of 
the century, developments in the materials and production techniques of both the 
disc and the cylinder improved both the sound quality and overall accessibility of 
recordings.45  
As a result of these technological advances, Congress once again had to revise the 
copyright scheme.46 The revision that followed expanded copyright protections by 
recognizing an exclusive right to make mechanical reproductions of songs in 
 
 33.  Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). 
 34.  Id.; See Maria A. Pallante, ASCAP at 100, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 545, 545–46 (2014).  
 35.  See Zvi S. Rosen, The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A Prehistory of the Exclusive Right of Public 
Performance for Musical Compositions, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 1157, 1168–69 (2007). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 392, 29 Stat. 694, 694–95 (1897). 
 38.  Taintor, supra note 31. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Taintor, supra note 31. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
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“phonorecords.”47 In doing so, Congress established a compulsory licensing scheme 
which set a royalty rate of two cents per mechanical reproduction and required that 
manufacturers provide honest monthly accounting statements.48 This statutory 
licensing scheme was largely motivated by antitrust considerations intending to 
prevent music publishers from creating a monopoly by buying up all music rights 
and then setting their own prices.49  
In the decades that followed the Copyright Act of 1909, technological advances 
continued to improve music quality and accessibility.50 As this was occurring, 
Congress began to recognize that artists’ sound recordings were themselves deserving 
of their own distinct copyright protections.51 While the Sound Recording Act of 1971 
was a step in the right direction, these protections were limited only to sound 
recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972, and, until more recently, protected 
only the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, and preparation of derivative 
works.52 For sound recordings created before 1972, the copyright owners had to rely 
on state law protections, if they existed.53  
Like the Copyright Act of 1831, the Sound Recording Act of 1971 did not grant an 
exclusive right of public performance.54 This changed in 1995 when Congress passed 
the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (“DPRA”)55 in response to 
the emergence of music streaming which threatened to displace sales of physical 
records and leave artists and their labels uncompensated for the widespread 
enjoyment of their work.56  The DPRA created a limited digital performance right for 
sound recordings by way of a three-tiered licensing scheme.57 Under this scheme, 
 
 47.  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60 349, §1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 76 (1909). In those days, 
“phonorecords” were mainly piano rolls and phonograph cylinders, but, in the modern era, this term has been 
applied to vinyl records and CDs. MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 17. 
 48.  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60 349, §1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909) (“That whenever the owner 
of a musical copyright has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work upon 
the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may make similar 
use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of two cents on each such 
part manufactured, to be paid by the manufacturer thereof”).  
 49.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 26. 
 50.  See generally Taintor, supra note 31. 
 51.  Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92 140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
 52.  Id. at 392. 
 53.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); The Copyright Act expressly permits states to continue state law protection 
for pre 1972 sound recordings until February 15, 2067, at which time all state protection will be preempted by 
federal law and pre 1972 sound recordings will enter the public domain. Id. 
 54.  See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92 140, 85 Stat. 391. 
 55.  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 56.  See Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 57.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012). The public-performance right for sound recordings is limited in that it 
entitles the holder to royalties only for public performances “by means of a digital audio transmission.”  
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sound recording copyright owners maintain full exclusive rights when dealing with 
interactive music providers, are subject to a compulsory licensing scheme when 
dealing with certain noninteractive music providers, and are not entitled to any 
royalties from nonsubscription broadcast music providers (terrestrial radio).58  In 
addition, the DPRA clarified that digital files could be considered musical works for 
purposes of copyright protection.59 
B.  The Musical Work and the Sound Recording 
When a consumer listens to a song on Spotify, Pandora, or the radio, what they are 
ultimately consuming is two distinct copyrighted products: (1) the musical work as 
written and composed by the songwriter(s), and (2) the sound recording of the 
musical work that has been fixed in a recording medium such as a vinyl or digital 
file.60 Despite the fundamental similarities between these two products, the rates for 
the various licenses associated with them are established by different entities and 
standards. 
Today, authors of musical works and sound recordings possess exclusive alienable 
rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106.61 These include: the mechanical right to make and 
distribute copies of the work;62 the right to create derivative works;63 the right to 
display the work publicly;64 and the right to perform the work publicly.65  In addition 
to these rights, the music industry along with certain judicial circuits have also 
acknowledged that owners maintain the exclusive right to pair the music with a 
video.66 This right is commonly referred to as the synchronization (or “synch”) right 
and is a hybrid of the reproduction and derivative work rights.67  
 
 58.  17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). 
 59.  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104 39, § 4, 109 Stat. 336, 345 
(1995) (“A compulsory license under this section includes the right of the compulsory licensee to distribute or 
authorize the distribution of a phonorecord of a nondramatic musical work by means of a digital transmission 
. . .”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
 60.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3). This may be sheet music, records, tapes, CDs and digital audio files. 
 63.  17 U.S.C. § 106(2). This may be a new work based on an existing composition. 
 64.  17 U.S.C. § 106(5). This may be by posting lyrics on a website. 
 65.  17 U.S.C. § 106(4). This may be in a live venue or broadcast. 
 66.  See Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing that a defendant 
“might have infringed [plaintiff’s] exclusive right to prepare derivative works” by synchronizing music to an 
audiovisual work); Buffalo Broad. Co., Inc., v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The ‘synch’ right is a 
form of the reproduction right also created by statute as one of the exclusive rights enjoyed by the copyright 
owner”).  
 67.  See id. 
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i. The Musical Work 
The creative process generally begins with the songwriter authoring the lyrics and 
composition that go into a musical work.68  In some instances, a musical work will 
have multiple songwriters.69 Regardless, in order to focus their efforts on making 
music, many songwriters enter into publishing agreements with music publishers to 
finance their writing, promote their works, and administer their copyrights for 
them.70 Under such arrangements, the publisher usually pays an advance to the 
songwriter against future royalty collections.71 
Although songwriters and publishers may sell the right to perform their musical 
work publicly to music providers such as radio stations, concert halls, and similar 
venues directly, usually, songwriters and publishers will enlist Performing Rights 
Organizations (“PROs”) to administer and distribute these performing rights for 
them.72 Under this arrangement, the PRO works with the publishers and songwriters 
to manage and license the performing rights of their musical works to music 
providers in a blanket licensing scheme that allows the providers to pay one fee for 
the rights to the entire PRO’s catalog.73 Upon receiving the fee, the PRO keeps a 
portion for itself and sends the rest back to the songwriter and publisher.74 The 
amount sent to the songwriter and publisher is dependent upon how many times a 
particular musical work is played.75 
Rates for public performance licenses purchased from the two largest PROs, 
ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”), are overseen by rate courts which sit in 
the Southern District of New York.76  In 1941 and 1966, the United States brought 
antitrust actions against ASCAP and BMI respectively.77  Both suits resulted in 
consent decrees that provided certain protections for prospective music licensees.78  
These consent decrees are largely still in place today.79  Where ASCAP or BMI and a 
 
 68.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 18.  
 69.  See, e.g., THE BEATLES, I Want to Hold Your Hand, on MEET THE BEATLES! (Capitol Records 1964) (written 
by John Lennon and Paul McCartney). 
 70.  DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 219–20 (8th ed. 2012).  
 71.  Id. 
 72. MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 32–33. The two largest PROs: the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) together represent close to 
ninety percent of the songs available for licensing in the United States. Ben Sisario, Pandora Suit May Upend 
Century Old Royalty Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/14/business/ 
media/pandora-suit-may-upend-century-old-royalty-plan.html.   
 73.  PASSMAN, supra note 70, at 239. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc., 683 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 77.  Id. at 35. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See id. 
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prospective licensee have reached an impasse over fees, under the consent decree, 
either party may petition the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York to set a “reasonable” licensing fee.80  “Fundamental to the concept of 
‘reasonableness’ is a determination of what an applicant would pay in a competitive 
market, taking into account the fact that [the PRO], as a monopolist, ‘exercise[s] 
disproportionate power over the market for music rights.’”81  Agreements reached 
after arms’ length negotiation between other similar parties in the industry, serve as 
benchmarks and are often used by the rate court in determining the reasonable value 
of the music.82  In assessing whether another agreement provides a valid benchmark, 
the district court must consider whether the other agreement dealt with a comparable 
right, whether it involved similar parties in similar economic circumstances, and 
whether it arose in a sufficiently competitive market.83  
Similarly, publishers may also choose to work with mechanical rights 
administrators to manage the rights to reproduce the musical works.84 These 
administrators issue mechanical licenses for the publisher, police them, and 
ultimately account to the publisher.85 For their services, the administrators usually 
keep some percent of the gross monies collected.86 
Though it has been amended and expanded several times, the 1909 compulsory 
licensing scheme for the mechanical reproduction of musical works, originally set 
forth in section 1(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909, largely remains today in what is 
now 17 U.S.C. § 115.87 Under this scheme, anyone wishing to make and distribute 
mechanical reproductions of a musical work can negotiate directly with the copyright 
owner to determine a royalty rate.88 If the parties are unable to come to an agreement, 
then the music provider may still secure the reproduction rights by:  (1) paying the 
requisite amount set forth by the compulsory licensing and rate setting provisions of 
the Act and the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”),89 and (2) serving a notice of intent 
 
 80.  Id. at 44. 
 81.  United States v. ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. BMI, 426 F.3d 91 (2d 
Cir. 2005)). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See BMI, 426 F.3d at 95. 
 84.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 21. 
 85.  PASSMAN, supra note 70, at 225. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Compare Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60 349, §1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (YEAR), with 17 U.S.C. § 115 
(2012). 
 88.  17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(E)(i) (“License agreements voluntarily negotiated at any time between one or 
more copyright owners of nondramatic musical works and one or more persons entitled to obtain a compulsory 
license under subsection (a)(1) shall be given effect in lieu of any determination by the Librarian of Congress and 
Copyright Royalty Judges.”). 
 89.  17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) (“With respect to each work embodied in the phonorecord, the royalty shall be 
either two and three-fourths cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of playing time or fraction thereof, 
whichever amount is larger.”). 
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(“NOI”) on the copyright owner no later than thirty days after making and before 
distributing any phonorecords.90 After securing these rights, the licensee must 
provide statements of account and pay the statutorily prescribed or negotiated 
royalties on a monthly basis.91  
The CRB is composed of three administrative judges who reexamine the licensing 
rates and set a new schedule as required.92 Rates for licenses are established in 
accordance with the guidelines set forth in 17 U.S.C.  § 801(b)(1) of the Copyright 
Act.93 Under this section, the CRB calculates adjustments to royalty rates with the 
following objectives in mind: 
(a) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public, (b) To afford 
the copyright owner a fair return for his or her creative work and the 
copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions, (c) To reflect 
the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product 
made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, 
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to 
the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their 
communication, and (d) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure 
of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.94  
The rates currently applicable under § 115 are the result of an industry-wide 
negotiated agreement that was submitted to the CRB as a settlement of the most 
recent rate-setting proceeding.95  
 
 90.  17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1). 
 91.  17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(5) states:  
Royalty payments shall be made on or before the twentieth day of each month and shall include all 
royalties for the month next preceding. Each monthly payment shall be made under oath and shall 
comply with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation. The Register 
shall also prescribe regulations under which detailed cumulative annual statements of account, 
certified by a certified public accountant, shall be filed for every compulsory license under this section. 
The regulations covering both the monthly and the annual statements of account shall prescribe the 
form, content, and manner of certification with respect to the number of records made and the 
number of records distributed.  
 92.  17 U.S.C. § 801. 
 93.  Id. at § 801(b)(1) (“[T]he functions of the Copyright Royalty Judges shall be as follows: (1) To make 
determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments as provided in sections 112(e), 
114, 115, 116, 118, 119, and 1004.”). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See 37 C.F.R. 385 (2015). 
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ii. The Sound Recording 
In order to become a sound recording, the musical work must be affixed to an audible 
medium.96 In the music business, unless they choose to remain independent, 
recording artists often sign with record labels.97 Much like the publisher, a record 
label’s typical role is to finance the production of the sound recordings, promote 
them, and distribute them to music providers.98 In some instances, the recording 
artists are not the same people as the songwriters.99 Regardless, both record labels and 
recording artists usually maintain distinct ownership interests in the sound 
recordings depending upon the contractual agreement.100  
Rates for the mechanical reproduction rights of sound recordings are negotiated 
in the free market with the recording artists and record labels directly.101  Rates for the 
public performance rights of sound recordings are set according to the three tiered 
scheme in the DPRA as codified in 17 U.S.C. § 114.102  
III.  ISSUES IN TODAY’S MUUSIC MARKET AND REGULATORY SCHEME 
There are numerous inefficiencies plaguing the music market and its participants. 
First, songwriters and recording artists do not feel as if they are being compensated 
fairly for their works and recordings.103 Second, inconsistent rate-setting standards 
provide competitive advantages to select music providers.104 Third, no federal 
protections are offered for pre-1972 sound recordings, forcing providers and owners 
to navigate the differing copyright laws of each state.105 Fourth, terrestrial radio 
stations benefit from favorable protections that preclude them from having to pay 
public performance royalties for sound recordings.106 Last, market participants are 
often unable to access the information necessary to correctly identify the rights 
holders, which causes uncertainty and avoidable copyright infringement.107  
 
 96.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 97.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 22. 
 98.  PASSMAN, supra note 70, at 63. 
 99.  See, e.g., LIL WAYNE, A Milli, on THE CARTER III (Cash Money 2008). 
 100.  PASSMAN, supra note 70, at 74. 
 101.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 43. 
 102.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114. See also supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 103.  See infra Part III.A. 
 104.  See infra Part III.B. 
 105.  See infra Part III.C. 
 106.  See infra Part III.D. 
 107.  See infra Part III.E. 
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A.  Shift in Artists’ Income Streams 
Over the past ten years, many songwriters have experienced a significant decline in 
their income.108 As has been stated, many attribute this decline to the shift in how 
music is consumed.109 In recent years, music consumption has shifted from 
purchasing physical albums and digital tracks to Internet streaming and radio 
services.110 This is problematic for several reasons. Typically, songwriters rely on three 
sources of income: mechanical reproduction royalties from the distribution of their 
musical work, synchronization royalties, and performance royalties.111 Because 
consumers are not purchasing as many mechanical reproductions of musical works 
as they used to, artists are now more reliant upon performance royalties to make a 
living.112 And, while this reliance has greatly affected artists across the board, it has 
disproportionately impacted the smaller independent artists who are less capable of 
financing the lucrative tours and promotion necessary to make up for the loss in 
album and track sales.113 Unlike Taylor Swift who can withhold her music from 
interactive music provider giants such as Apple,114 many smaller artists do not 
maintain the same negotiating position.115 
Digital music providers, on the other hand, do not believe that they are entirely to 
blame for this trend.116 Many of these services assert that they provide copyright 
owners with entirely new revenue streams by paying performance royalties to both 
sound recording and musical work owners.117 In addition, digital music providers also 
ascribe blame to the general decrease in consumer discretionary spending and the 
poor accounting practices of intermediaries that receive and distribute the royalty 
payments.118  
 
 108.  See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 69.  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  See NIELSEN, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 111.  See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 69.  
 112.  Id. at 70. 
 113.  Nate Rau, Nashville’s Musical Middle Class Collapses, THE TENNESSEAN (Jan. 28, 2015), http:// 
www.tennessean.com/story/entertainment/music/2015/01/04/nashville musical middle classcollapses new 
dylans/21236245/ (observing that industry trends have led to “the collapse of Nashville’s music middle class”). 
 114.  See Taylor Swift, To Apple, Love Taylor, TUMBLR (June 21, 2015), http://taylorswift. 
tumblr.com/post/122071902085/to-apple-love-taylor;  
 115.  See Annie Lowry, The Music Middle-Class is Getting Squeezed, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/11/music-middle-class-is-getting-squeezed.html. 
 116.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 73–74.  
 117.  Id. at 76. 
 118.  Id. at 72, 77. 
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B.  Inconsistent Rate Setting Standards  
Stakeholders have also found that inconsistent rate setting standards which favor 
older music providers and differ for musical works and sound recordings have 
inhibited fair competition between fundamentally similar services and products.119 In 
an age where choosing between Spotify, Pandora, SiriusXM, or the radio requires 
moving a finger an inch between apps, consumers are able to shop between music 
providers more frequently than ever before. Given that these services are all directly 
vying for the consumer’s ear, it should follow that they are all competing on even 
ground. This is not the case, however. 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 115, music providers have the option to either negotiate the 
rates for the mechanical reproduction rights for the musical work or use the 
compulsory licensing scheme established by the CRB using the four-factor, industry-
conscious standard from section 801(b)(1).120 As stated earlier, this test balances the 
interests of the artist, licensee, and the music industry as a whole in an effort to 
maximize the availability of the creative work and adequately compensate each party 
for their relative input in the revenue making process.121 Meanwhile, sound recording 
owners may negotiate their mechanical reproduction rates directly with music 
providers in the free market.122
 
For public performance rights, rates for the public performance rights of musical 
works are set according to the “reasonable” standard as dictated by the Southern 
District of New York.123 Whereas, under the three-tiered scheme of 17 U.S.C. § 114, 
rates for the public performance of sound recordings vary depending upon the music 
provider.124 Interactive music providers negotiate their rates in the free market.125 A 
limited set of older noninteractive music services such as Sirius XM, Music Choice, 
and Muzak are subject to the more favorable compulsory royalty rates established by 
the same four-factor, industry-preserving section 801(b)(1).126 Internet radio and 
newer noninteractive subscription services are subject to compulsory royalty rates set 
using the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard.127 And, lastly, terrestrial radio 
broadcasters are not required to pay royalties at all.128 
Many believe that the free market or willing buyer/willing seller standard yields 
more market-oriented rates than those established under section 801(b)(1) and as a 
 
 119.  Id. at 81. 
 120.  See supra notes 81–87. 
 121.  17 U.S.C. § 801.  
 122.  See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 43. 
 123.  Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc., 683 F.3d 32, 44 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 124.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
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result generates higher payouts to artists to the detriment of newer services.129 
Naturally, copyright owners prefer this standard while those protected music services 
prefer section 801(b)(1)’s industry conscious approach to rate setting.130 Despite this 
disagreement, most stakeholders recognize the problematic nature of a licensing 
system that maintains different rate setting standards amongst similar competitors in 
the market.131  
C.  Pre-1972 Recordings 
Because the Copyright Act does not govern pre-1972 recordings, copyright owners, 
rights managers, and music providers are forced to navigate the varying state law 
requirements and protections for these recordings.132 In an extensive report that 
examined the necessity of full federalization of pre-1972 recordings, the U.S. 
Copyright Office found that “the protections that state law provides for pre-1972 
sound recordings are inconsistent and sometimes vague and difficult to discern.”133 
This uncertainty has led music providers to take different approaches with regard to 
royalty payments for these works with some opting to assume the risk of 
nonpayment.134  
The issue is best illustrated by a series of lawsuits filed throughout the country by 
Flo & Eddie Inc., owners of the pre-1972 sound recordings of the American rock 
group, the Turtles.135 In these cases, the copyright owners allege state law claims as the 
basis for the right to be compensated for the public transmission of their 
recordings.136  
As part of its service, SiriusXM broadcasts decade-specific stations such as “60s on 
6,” where the Turtles’ songs can be heard.137 Flo & Eddie filed these lawsuits on behalf 
of itself and all other “owners of sound recordings . . . ‘fixed’ (i.e., recorded) prior to 
February 15, 1972” alleging that by failing to license or otherwise compensate artists 
for the right to “perform” their pre-1972 sound recordings, SiriusXM infringed their 
public performance rights in violation of pertinent state copyright and 
 
 129.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 81. 
 130.  Id. at 82. 
 131.  Id. at 81. 
 132.  See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (“Congress has indicated neither that it wishes to 
protect, nor to free from protection, recordings of musical performances fixed prior to February 15, 1972.”). 
 133.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 48 (2011). 
 134.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 85. 
 135.  See, e.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Flo & Eddie, 
Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13-23182-CIV, 2015 WL 3852692 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2015); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. 
Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 2:13-cv-05693, 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014). 
 136.  E.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d at 335.  
 137.  Id. at 331. 
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misappropriation laws.138 In response, SiriusXM denied that the respective state 
statutes provided for, or otherwise allowed the inference of, a public performance 
right in pre-1972 sound recordings.139 
The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted 
summary judgment in favor of Flo & Eddie, rejecting SiriusXM’s argument that “the 
bundle of rights that attaches to copyright ownership of a pre-1972 sound recording 
does not include the exclusive right to publicly perform the recording.”140 The court 
held that, pursuant to California statute, copyright ownership of a pre-1972 sound 
recording includes the exclusive right to publicly perform the recording.141 
Accordingly, if anyone wishes to publicly perform such a recording in Florida, they 
must seek authorization from the recording’s owner.142 
In the New York case, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York similarly held that Flo & Eddie maintains the exclusive right to perform 
the sound recordings, and denied SiriusXM’s motion for summary judgment on the 
issue.143 In February 2015, however, the court granted SiriusXM’s motion to certify 
an interlocutory appeal, and that lawsuit is now stayed pending a decision by the 
Court of Appeals in New York as to whether, under New York law, the holders of 
common law copyrights in pre-1972 sound recordings have an exclusive right of 
public performance in their recordings.144 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, however, 
held that Florida common law does not provide Flo & Eddie with an exclusive right 
to the public performance of the sound recordings.145 In granting summary judgment 
for SiriusXM,146 the court recognized that another Florida federal court held that the 
state does recognize common law copyrights in sound recordings,147 but it did not 
decide whether these common law rights in sound recordings extended to their 
public performance.148 The court noted that while California maintains a statute that 
provides artists with exclusive ownership interests in their sound recordings, and 
 
 138.  Complaint at 1, Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13 
CIV 5784). 
 139.  E.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d at 336. 
 140.  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 2:13-cv-05693, 2014 WL 4725382, at *3, *10 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 22, 2014). 
 141.  Id. at *4–*5. 
 142.  See id. *9–*10. 
 143.  Flo & Eddie, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d at 344, 353. 
 144.  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2016), certifying questions to 52 
N.E.3d 240 (N.Y. 2016). 
 145.  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13-23182-CIV, 2015 WL 3852692, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 
22, 2015). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at *4. 
 148.  Id. 
DEMOS Page Proof v2 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2016  5:50 PM 
 The Fair Pay Fair Play Act of 2015 
88 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
New York has binding precedent addressing these issues, Florida does not.149 It 
declined to be the first to rule on the issue, stating: “whether copyright protection for 
pre-1972 recordings should include the exclusive right to public performance is for 
the Florida legislature.”150 
As has been demonstrated, some states have statutes that address the unauthorized 
use of pre-1972 sound recordings.151  Others offer varying degrees of protection 
through the common law tort claims of unfair competition or misappropriation.152 
Nonetheless, as a general matter, many stakeholders support at least some form of 
federalization of protections for these sound recordings.153 And, while digital music 
services would ultimately prefer not to pay royalties for these recordings, there is at 
least some consensus that a federalized licensing scheme would be preferable and 
more efficient as opposed to the current method of obtaining licenses over scattered 
state laws.154 
D.  The Terrestrial Radio Exemption 
Current law does not require traditional terrestrial or AM/FM radio broadcasters to 
compensate sound recording owners for the public performance of their 
recordings.155 Recording artists and record labels argue that they should be 
compensated by terrestrial radio stations in the same way that they are by Internet 
streaming services.156 In response, terrestrial radio broadcasters argue that they are 
providing free promotion for these recordings which ultimately translate to record 
sales.157 Despite this consideration, recording owners maintain that the promotional 
 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 2:13-cv-05693, 2014 WL 4725382, * (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
22, 2014). The case cites CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2) which provides:  
The author of an original work of authorship consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior to 
February 15, 1972, has an exclusive ownership therein until February 15, 2047, as against all persons 
except one who independently makes or duplicates another sound recording that does not directly or 
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in such prior recording, but consists entirely of an 
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate the sounds 
contained in the prior sound recording. 
Id. 
 152.  See, e.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d at 338 (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc. 
(Naxos), 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005)). 
 153.  See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 85. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  17 U.S.C. § 114. 
 156.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 87–88. 
 157.  Id. at 89. 
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effect of radio airplay is overstated, and that they should not be forced to forgo 
compensation in exchange for promotion they believe is over-valued.158 
In addition, copyright owners and digital streaming services together urge that the 
current law gives terrestrial radio an unwarranted market protection and competitive 
advantage over newer, innovative services in the market which are providing the 
same product.159 Like the argument against market protections for older satellite radio 
broadcasters stated supra, they note that wireless communications technologies (i.e. 
cellphones) have developed to the point where newer services are competing directly 
with traditional terrestrial radio in that consumers are now able to freely choose 
between whether to stream music through their phone or listen to a terrestrial 
broadcast providing the same music.160  
E.   A Lack of Reliable Copyright Ownership Information 
Information asymmetry is also a significant inefficiency plaguing the music market. 
Licensees complain that the lack of readily available data concerning musical work 
ownership proves to be quite costly for the industry.161 Many
 
digital services have 
asserted that the inaccessibility of ownership information leads to costly efforts to 
identify the rights holders and, in some instances, has resulted in incomplete or 
incorrect licenses, which, in turn, exposes the licensee to potential statutory 
infringement damages.162 This lack of accurate ownership information also affects 
accounting practices and hinders the efficient distribution of royalties.  
To make matters worse, there is a distinct lack of trust among various industry 
participants. The Digital Media Association (DiMa), a national trade organization 
that represents the interests of online audio and video industries, has stated that 
“there is little transparency about what happens to the significant royalties generated 
from digital music services after they are paid to record labels, music publishers, and 
PROs, and processed under the financial terms of recording artists’ and songwriters’ 
own private arrangements with rights owners.”163 This sentiment is shared by content 
creators as well.164 Both the Screen Actors Guild (SAG-AFTRA) and the American 
Federation of Musicians (AFM) have also expressed a similar worry that direct 
licensing deals “can create uncertainty regarding which benefits of the deal are subject 
to being shared with artists at all.”165  
 
 158.  Id. at 88. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 107. 
 162.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 107. 
 163.  Id. at 77. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As has been demonstrated, many of the inefficiencies affecting the music market are 
interrelated. Consequently, in order to meaningfully address these issues, Congress 
must enact comprehensive legislation that together: (1) eliminates the differential 
treatment of sound recordings and musical works, (2) eliminates the terrestrial radio 
exemption to royalty obligations, (3) incorporates pre-1972 recordings into the 
federal regulatory scheme, (4) establishes a consistent fair market value standard for 
licenses across the entire market, and (5) creates incentives that foster the public 
availability of accurate song ownership data and accounting.  
A.  Eliminate the Differential Treatment of Sound Recordings and Musical Works 
As illustrated above, inconsistent rate setting standards result in significantly higher 
rates being paid for sound recordings than for musical works.166 This can be explained 
by the fact that, apart from noninteractive streaming uses, sound recording owners 
are able to negotiate their royalty rates in the free market while owners of musical 
works are subject to the compulsory federal rate-setting entities that price their 
mechanical reproduction rights with an industry-preserving consideration.167  
In order to solve this discrepancy, Congress must establish uniformity in how rates 
are set for both. This would mean that where sound recording owners have the ability 
to negotiate digital rates in the open market, so should owners of musical works. 
Further, where sound recording owners are subject to compulsory licensing and rate 
setting procedures, rates for musical works should remain similarly regulated.  
Although implementation of this system is complicated by the differing licensing 
frameworks, simply establishing a free-market rate-setting standard for the licensing 
of musical works to interactive services would significantly address the issue. 
Ultimately, treating analogous uses alike in the digital environment is more likely to 
yield equitable rates between sound recordings and musical works without 
necessarily requiring that these products be priced equivalently. 
B.  Eliminate the Terrestrial Radio Exemption to Royalty Obligations 
As has been explained, the federal government does not require terrestrial radio 
broadcasters, a multi-billion dollar industry,
 
to pay sound recording royalties to those 
who contribute the sound recordings they play daily.168
 
Apart from being inequitable 
to rights holders, the terrestrial radio exemption from paying royalties harms 
competing satellite and Internet radio providers who must pay for the use of those 
 
 166.  See supra Part III.B. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  See supra Part III.D. 
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same sound recordings.169 In a market where artists rely more heavily on income from 
public performances rather than record sales, the inability to collect from terrestrial 
radio increases the pressure on paying sources and hurts the artist.170 Furthermore, as 
consumption patterns move away from music ownership, the potential for sales is 
becoming less relevant, and the promotional value of radio less useful.171 
Nonetheless, the creation of a terrestrial sound recording performance right need 
not overlook or negate the question of promotional value. Instead, this factor can be 
taken into account by a rate setting authority, or in private negotiations, to arrive at 
an appropriate royalty rate. Such an approach would appear to be a logical solution 
as it allows for all of these considerations to be taken into account. 
C.  Incorporate Pre-1972 Recordings into the Regulatory Scheme 
Since 2011, there have been significant developments in Florida, California, and New 
York state case law which demonstrate the need for a unified federal approach for all 
sound recordings.172 In these jurisdictions, trial courts have ruled unevenly on 
whether performances of the plaintiffs’ pre-1972 sound recordings are protected 
under applicable state law.173 This means that, in certain states, music providers must 
obtain licenses from sound recording owners to perform the recordings while in 
others they do not.174 Even though several states have recognized these rights, the 
copyright protections are not necessarily identical across different jurisdictions and 
interested licensees may not rely upon the predictable procedures of sections 112 and 
114 to obtain licenses.175  
In 2014, SoundExchange176 and several other major players in the music industry 
lobbied for legislation known as the RESPECT Act to “provide for the payment of 
royalties for the performance of sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, 
and for other purposes.”177 The Act would require digital music services to pay 
royalties for sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972 in the same manner as 
they pay royalties for sound recordings protected by federal copyright that are fixed 
after such date.178 It also provides a remedy by establishing a private right of action in 
 
 169.   Id. 
 170.  See supra Part III.A. 
 171.  See supra Part III.A. 
 172.  See supra notes 114–31. 
 173.  See supra notes 114–31. 
 174.  See supra notes 114–31. 
 175.  See supra notes 114–31. 
 176.  SoundExchange is the independent nonprofit organization that collects and distributes digital 
performance royalties to featured artists and copyright holders. 
 177.  See RESPECT Act, H.R. 4772, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 178.  Id. at § 2. 
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federal court if a digital music service fails to make such payments.179 While this 
proposed legislation represents a step in the right direction, it still fails to confer the 
full federal copyright protections to pre-1972 rights owners that modern music artists 
enjoy. This disproportionate treatment makes little sense in an era where pre-1972 
music is easily re-mastered and distributed widely in digital form. For these reasons, 
full federalization remains the best alternative. 
D.   Establish a Consistent Fair Market Standard for All Music Distribution Services  
As has been demonstrated, where the government has stepped in to establish rates 
for the use of music, it has acted in an inconsistent fashion.180 In some cases, the law 
provides that the rate setting authority should attempt to emulate the free market.181 
In others, the law imposes a more policy-oriented industry conscious approach.182 
There is little reason for the inconsistency in how rates are set across 
fundamentally similar services like SiriusXM and Pandora. There is no longer a 
threatened piano roll monopoly and satellite radio is a mature business that no longer 
needs the protection that it once did. Furthermore, the notion that music creators 
subsidize those who seek to profit from their works is fundamentally unfair. For these 
reasons, Congress should establish a uniform fair market standard across the board 
for these fundamentally similar services.  
E.  Create Incentives that Promote Accurate Song Ownership Data and Accounting 
There appears to be unanimous agreement among industry participants that 
accurate, and accessible licensing information and data are essential to an efficient 
music licensing system and market.183 Some stakeholders have suggested that the 
government undertake the task of creating and maintaining a comprehensive 
database.184 As simple as that solution may seem, having the government start from 
scratch and mine/constantly monitor millions of data points would take years and 
millions of dollars to accomplish. Not only would such a service be incredibly costly 
for the American taxpayers, but these functions are largely already performed by 
existing private organizations in collaboration with individual stakeholders. For this 
reason, the government should instead establish incentives through the statutory 
licensing regime that encourage private actors to coordinate their efforts and 
contribute to a publicly accessible and authoritative database. The benefits of 
administrative efficiency and ensuring that the correct rights-holders are 
 
 179.   Id. 
 180.  See supra Part III.B. 
 181.  See supra Part III.B. 
 182.  See supra Part III.B. 
 183.  See supra Part III.E. 
 184.  MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 12, at 183. 
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compensated would likely outweigh any additional costs to the rights holders and 
licensees that may result. 
V.  THE FAIR PLAY FAIR PAY ACT 
The Fair Play Fair Pay Act, if passed, would result in extensive changes to the music 
licensing system.  Its provisions establishing (1) equitable treatment for terrestrial 
broadcasts and Internet services, (2) uniform rate setting procedures, (3) protections 
for pre-1972 recordings, and (4) mechanisms to track ownership and ensure royalties 
are properly distributed would significantly address many of the problems outlined 
above.  
A.  Equitable Treatment for Terrestrial Broadcasts and Internet Services 
One of the main objectives of the FPFPA is to eliminate the differential treatment 
between terrestrial and digital-radio transmissions so that that all broadcasters would 
be required to pay for their public performance of sound recordings.185 As discussed 
above, the fact that satellite, cable, and Internet radio services are currently required 
to pay a public performance royalty for their use of sound recordings, while 
traditional terrestrial radio broadcasters are not is problematic. 
Section 2 of the bill would amend the Copyright Act to eliminate language 
contained within § 106 limiting this right to digital audio transmissions.186 
Specifically, the bill does so by redefining “audio transmission” to include the 
transmission of any sound recording, regardless of its audio format.187 The bill also 
strikes references to “digital audio transmissions” found in §§ 106(6) and 114(d)(1) 
of the Act, so as to provide for a much broader and unlimited right in the public 
performance of sound recordings by means of any “audio transmission.”188 Thus, if 
the FPFPA is passed, terrestrial radio stations will no longer enjoy the same 
protections that they do now and would be required to pay royalties. 
B.  Ensuring Platform Parity: Uniform Rate Standard 
Also central to the FPFPA is the elimination of the disparate standards applied by the 
CRB when setting royalty rates. To level the playing field across various music 
platforms, Section 4 of the FPFPA removes the § 801(b) rate-setting standard 
currently used to determine royalty rates for pre-1998 services and replaces this 
standard with the willing buyer/willing seller standard.189 When considered alongside 
its implementation of a terrestrial public performance right, the FPFPA would amend 
 
 185.  The Fair Play Fair Pay Act of 2015, H.R. 1733, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). 
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  H.R. 1733 § 4. 
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the Copyright Act to allow the CRB to apply the willing buyer/willing seller standard 
in all proceedings where a compulsory rate is being established for a public 
performance of sound recordings, regardless of the platform in which the 
performance is being transmitted.190 This leveling of the playing field would 
undoubtedly address several of the issues affecting artists and newer noninteractive 
services under the current scheme. 
C.  Equitable Treatment of Legacy Sound Recordings 
Another purpose behind the FPFPA is to create an avenue by which owners of pre-
1972 sound recordings are compensated for the public performance of their 
recordings.191 Section 7 of the FPFPA would amend § 114(f)(3) of the Copyright Act 
by adding the following language at the end of the provision: 
Any person publicly performing sound recordings protected under this title by 
means of transmissions under a statutory license under this section, or making 
reproductions of such sound recordings under section 112(e), shall make royalty 
payments for transmissions that person makes of sound recordings that were fixed 
before February 15, 1972, and reproductions that person makes of those sound 
recordings under the circumstances described in section 112(e)(1), in the same 
manner as such person does for sound recordings that are protected under this title.192 
Similar to the RESPECT Act, this section provides a substantial benefit to the 
owners of some of the most prolific and valuable recordings of the twenty-first 
century, but it still does not provide the full federal protections enjoyed by modern 
artists. 
D.  Allocation of Payments to Music Producers: Letters of Direction 
Another component of the FPFPA is to secure payment rights for producers, mixers, 
engineers, and those who participate in the production of sound recordings, but who 
do not themselves hold an ownership interest in the recording’s copyright.193 Section 
9 of the bill would implement a policy that would allow producers and others 
involved in the creative process to submit letters of direction to third-party collection 
societies (such as SoundExchange) that would entitle these individuals to receive 
their royalty payments directly from the collection society.194 This would significantly 
address issues surrounding uncertain song ownership data and royalty payment 
information without placing a costly burden on rights holders. 
 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See H.R. 1733 § 7. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See H.R. 1733 § 9. 
 194.  Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, in order to meaningfully and fully address the issues facing the music 
marketplace, Congress must enact comprehensive legislation that together: (1) 
eliminates the differential treatment of sound recordings and musical works, (2) 
eliminates the terrestrial radio exemption to royalty obligations, (3) incorporates pre-
1972 recordings into the federal regulatory scheme, (4) establishes a consistent fair 
market value standard for licenses across the entire market, and (5) creates incentives 
that foster the public availability of accurate song ownership data and accounting.  
The Fair Play Fair Pay Act embodies many of these policy objectives and represents 
common sense legislation that could meaningfully address the issues facing the music 
market today. 
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